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ROGER HAINES, JR.* 
In defense of the Relevant Conduct section of the Sentencing Guidelines, I 
would like to make three points: one of the charges that has been leveled 
against the Guidelines is that they are not individualized, and do not allow for 
individualized sentencing.  But any fair sentencing system has to take into 
account more than the elements of the offense. Even in state guideline schemes 
that do not have a relevant conduct guideline, it is understood that in 
sentencing within the state range the judge will consider the individual factors 
of the defendant, including how much harm he caused, and what his prior 
record is.  All these factors are laid out in the Federal Guidelines.  So if you 
examine these state systems, you will see that in order for a sentencing system 
to be perceived as fair, it has to take into account some “real offense” factors. 
The real complaint against the Guidelines is not that they consider “real 
offense” factors, but that they ordinarily prevent the judge from considering a 
defendant’s “specific offender characteristics,” that is, the defendant’s family 
background, youthfulness, drug addiction, et cetera. The reason the Guidelines 
generally bar these factors is that in the pre-Guideline era you had some judges 
who always ate hard-boiled eggs for breakfast and others who had them “over 
easy.”1  That is, some judges thought youth was a mitigating factor, while 
other judges thought youth was an aggravating factor, because youthful 
offenders tend to recidivate most often.  Likewise with addiction, some judges 
felt that addiction was a mitigating factor. But other judges would say addicts 
are more likely to recidivate, so they considered addiction an aggravating 
factor. The Sentencing Commission, I think very wisely, took the middle 
ground, deciding that judges generally cannot consider these “specific offender 
characteristics” at all, because these are the factors that have caused the most 
disparity among district judges.  In short, it was proper for the Commission to 
include “relevant conduct” and to ordinarily exclude “specific offender 
characteristics,” because both of these decisions enhance the “fairness” of the 
guidelines. 
My second point is about due process. It has been suggested that the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard allows judges to sentence defendants 
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 1. Editor’s note see Professor Michael Goldsmith’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 394, 
394-95 (2000) in this issue. 
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based on unreliable evidence. But ask any district judge, when was the last 
time he or she relied on evidence despite doubts about its reliability, simply 
because of the preponderance of the evidence standard. The judge would 
answer, “Never.”  This is because judges try to do justice. If they have 
substantial doubts about relevant conduct, they simply do not include it, 
regardless of the “preponderance” standard.  One indication of this is that there 
are very few reversals on appeal for unreliable evidence.  So the standard of 
review really does not make much difference.  I submit that the “tail is not 
wagging the dog.” 
Thirdly, a question was asked whether drug quantity and fraud loss should 
drive the Guidelines.  For drugs, I think the answer has been stated here many 
times; as long as there are statutory mandatory minimums, quantity will drive 
the drug Guidelines.  The same is probably true for fraud cases, because it is 
difficult to find any other single factor that so captures the harm caused by 
fraud.  With regard to “relevant conduct,” however, it is important to 
remember that if you are convicted of a fraud “scheme” or a drug 
“conspiracy,” the so-called “relevant conduct” is actually part of the offense of 
conviction.  It is not “relevant conduct” at all.  Thus, in “conspiracy” or 
“scheme” cases, it is not the “relevant conduct” that increases the sentence—it 
is the offense conduct itself. The other cases—where relevant conduct is used 
to increase the sentence of a defendant who is not convicted of a conspiracy or 
scheme—are a small part of the total number of drug and fraud cases. 
 
